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Surviving the Turbulence Is Not Enough: 
Can Côte d’Ivoire Flourish Again? 
 
Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans, it accounts for 40% 
of the WAEMU’s output, and 11% of its population are immigrant workers. Any political 
instability in the country will not only affect the domestic economy, but it will also affect the 
international trading markets. In addition, it will affect the West Africa region through trading 
of goods, through migration and the financial and banking sectors. With the new President 
sworn in on May 21, 2011, the political crisis is officially over. Real national reconciliation, 
however, will take much longer to happen. Serious economic issues need to be addressed, 
the country has high public debt, and its small and medium enterprises – the backbone of the 
economy – are severely hit. Côte d’Ivoire lags behind other developing countries in its 
preparedness and economic performance towards the Knowledge Economy, its educational 
sector is underperforming and powerless in producing a competitive labor force. Can the new 
President heal wounds and make the country flourish again? 
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I. Introduction 





 captured the interest of the international community and made front page news. 
The Western democracies along with the financial markets were conspicuously concerned about 
the economic repercussions of Côte d'Ivoire's escalating political conflict. This relatively small 
country in West Africa is the world's largest producer and exporter of Cocoa as well as an 
important exporter  of coffee, palm oil,  cashews, and wood products.  Naturally, political 
instability in the country can have serious economic ramifications world-wide. Beyond damaging 
its own domestic economy, Côte d'Ivoire's prolonged political crisis could also threaten West 
Africa's fragile economic recovery, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) study said in March 
2011. The executive board of IMF expressed anxiety over the potential adverse effects to the 
neighboring countries spreading via migration, trade and the financial sector (
).  
Côte d'Ivoire, the paragon of African development in the 1970s and 1980s, fell into a political 
impasse
2 in the last decade. A coup d'état and civil war in the early 2000s damaged the country. 
On August 5, 2010, the long awaited democratic elections were announced, and on October 31, 
2010, fourteen  candidates ran for the presidential  position.
3
Six months into the quagmire of having two presidents in the same city, and as the international 
community was becoming more and more anxious, Mr. Ouattara became the second President of 
  The two major candidates, Mr. 
Laurent Gbagbo (the incumbent President) and Mr. Alassane Ouattara (the challenger), ran again 
in a second-round run-off on November 28, 2010. Immediately after, both candidates, claimed to 
have won the elections,  each of them declared victory, each of them was  sworn  in as the 
President of Côte d'Ivoire and each of them set up his own cabinet and rival administrations. 
                                                           
1 In October 1985, Côte d'Ivoire became the official name of the country, registered with the United Nations and 
used by other governments. While its English translation is "Ivory Coast" the proper English name of the country is 
Côte d'Ivoire. Côte d'Ivoire is also the name that the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) employs, 
and the name we will be using in this paper.  
2 For more details on the political structure and development in Côte d'Ivoire since 1960, see Munoz-Perez and Tien 
(2007). 
3 Upon the announcement of democratic elections more than twenty candidates declared that they will run for 
president. The Supreme Court of Côte d'Ivoire validated the candidacy of only fourteen of them.  3 
 
the II Republic of Côte d'Ivoire on May 21, 2011.
4
Research has shown that when African Heads of State are educated abroad they are more likely 
to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) in their country (Constant and Tien, 2010). As the 
peoples of Côte d'Ivoire try to put the pieces together and regain their lives many questions and 
uncertainties  linger around. What will be  the  social and economic policy of the  new 
administration? How will the fiscal and monetary policies be handled? Will the country remain 
united? What will the country's external policy be? Can Côte d'Ivoire become a world economic 
player? and Can the new President mobilize the international community and push the country 
forward? 
 The new President set up his cabinet and 
administration in Abidjan, the largest city in the south and an important port in the region. 
President Ouattara is an economist educated in the U.S. He has held many powerful positions 
abroad and is internationally known. On May 27, for example, President Ouattara was invited to 
the G20-Summit in Deauville, France, and on July 29 he was invited by President Obama to the 
White House, along with three other heads of states from francophone African countries. 
The first 100 days that a new president is in power are customarily used as a yardstick to gauge 
the effectiveness of the new president and project the path of the country under his leadership. 
The first 100 days in power of the new President of Côte d'Ivoire will soon be over. Critics point 
out that since President Ouattara is in power he has spent a rather disproportional amount of time 
in public relations appearances domestically and abroad.  
In this paper, we seek to assess the first 100 days of the new administration in power, analyze the 
proposed economic program, and discuss the challenges that Mr. Ouattara and Côte d'Ivoire face. 
We proceed as follows: In Section II, we present the country, its history, its human and physical 
capital, its political system and we provide demographics and other statistics to give some 
background information. In Section III, we explicate the importance of the country in the world 
markets via its exports and in the migration of people within the continent. In Section IV, we 
discuss the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the leading role of 
Côte d'Ivoire in the region. In Section V, we analyze the budget and the current economic policy. 
                                                           
4 On April 11, 2011 Mr. Laurent Gbagbo was arrested by Mr. Ouattara's forces and with the United Nations backing 
and  France's military support. Mr. Gbagbo remains under house arrest.  In August 2011, he was charged with 
economic crimes. 4 
 
In Section VI, we evaluate the position of the country in the Knowledge Economy and the 
capability of the education sector to produce a competitive labor force. Finally, in Section VII, 
we assess the challenges that Côte d'Ivoire faces and draw our conclusions.  
 
II. Côte d'Ivoire, the Country, its Economy and the New Government 
 
Côte d'Ivoire became a French colony in 1893 and gained its independence from France in 1960. 
It has kept however, close ties with France, and French vestiges are apparent in the country to 
this day. The official language is French, the judicial and educational systems are very similar to 
the French system, a French military base (43
rd BIMA) is stationed in Abidjan, and the monetary 
currency is pegged to the French currency. Thousands of French expatriates still live and work in 
Côte d'Ivoire. The country's political system is also a copy of the French system of a presidential 
republic, in which the President has strong executive powers. 
Geographically, Côte d'Ivoire  lies  in  western  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  it  is  rich in natural 
resources.  It  has access to the sea  and serves as an important heaven for the surrounding 
landlocked countries. The two main religions are Roman Catholic and Islam.  More than 60 
ethnic groups live in Côte d'Ivoire. Box 1 provides basic statistics about the country. The country 
appears to have a bimodal distribution of human capital. While the adult literacy rate is about 
51% (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fabric/coteprof.htm), many Ivorians have tertiary 
education either from their country or from abroad. There are skill mismatches, however, that 
affect especially the youth. Young adults are often underemployed, or employed in the informal 
sector while queuing for a job in the public sector.  
<<<Box 1 about here>>> 
The country saw prosperous days in the 1960s and 1970s. Its thriving economy attracted many 
immigrants from other African countries, who went to Côte d'Ivoire to work. In 1999, however, 
the country experienced a military  coup  d'état.  In 2002,  a civil war broke out that split the 
country between north and south. For almost a decade now there is ongoing internal political 
conflict often paired with religious and ethnic clashes and geographic polarization.  5 
 
Sociopolitical conflict in the country notwithstanding, the country still attracts immigrants from 
neighboring countries. In 2010, immigrants composed 11.2% of the population. These are mostly 
low skilled workers, who help in agriculture. They send large amounts of remittances to their 
countries of origin that depend on remittances. There is also some brain drain going on; 5.4% of 
the native population emigrates. Studies show that native Ivorians are more likely to go to France 
than to any other country and this is due to the strong colonial ties between the two countries 
(Constant and Tien, 2009).   
Box 2 provides information about the country's currency and its monetary union with 
neighboring countries and France.  The common currency is the  CFA franc  that  stands for 
'Communauté Financière Africaine' or African Financial Community franc. During the turbulent 
past months of the political conflict, the idea of exiting the monetary union appeared to be 
plausible. The new administration, however has opted for maintaining the CFA franc as the 
national currency of Côte d'Ivoire and for remaining in the monetary union.  
<<<Box 2 about here>>> 
In June 2011, in a Letter of Intent to IMF requesting financial support, the new government 
outlined  the  policies  it intends to implement (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/civ/ 
062311.pdf). Consolidate peace through normalization and economic recovery was the first item 
on the document. The following five points delineate the new government's policy course: (i) 
restore security  within the country and provide safety for all; (ii) guarantee  the  efficient 
functioning of government; (iii) tend to societal demands and strengthen peace; (iv) recover 
social and economic infrastructures; and (v) improve the business sector and boost  good 
governance.  
The government's initial estimates of economic losses suffered by the private sector due to the 
political crisis were about 2 trillion CFA francs, or 20% of GDP (ibid). Violence during the 
period also cost thousands of human lives.  Of paramount importance at this juncture is the 
country's national reconciliation.  To  heal wounds and bring the country together, the new 
administration  set up the  'Commission Dialogue, Verité et Réconciliation'  or  National 
Reconciliation Commission. President Ouattara nominated the  members of the National 6 
 
Reconciliation Commission on September 5, 2011. The commission includes religious leaders 
and other national figures. It will seek to repair and reconstruct the country's social fabric.
5
Equally important and urgent is the economic reconstruction of the country. The political crisis 
severely suppressed economic activity and especially affected the small and medium enterprises. 
The new government laid out its economic plan. The Ministry of Economy and Finance of Côte 




 Compared to the 2010 
budget of 2,897 billion CFA francs, the new budget is higher by 153.4 billion CFA francs or by 
5.3%. It also appears that the new budget is skewed towards an expansionary fiscal policy.  
III. Côte d'Ivoire's Importance in the International Movement of Goods and People 
 
At first sight, it would appear that the political instability in Côte d'Ivoire and the associated 
economic  problems pertain to Ivorians  alone  or  at best to the country's  regional borders. 
However, with Côte d'Ivoire being a global competitive exporter of cocoa beans, the world 
markets are considerably affected by domestic instabilities in the country. Figure 1 displays the 
average cocoa price per ton (in US$) over the course of the last six years. It shows that since 
2005, the average cocoa price per ton has been on the rise, and this rise correlates with the 
political development in the country. For example, since the presidential elections were 
postponed in 2005, the average price of cocoa has been increasing; it reached its peak in early 
2011 amidst the post-election standoff and appears to follow a rather stable path since then.  
Over time, many international agencies have been reporting on the rise of the cocoa price and 
how this is  related  to the political actuality in Côte d'Ivoire.  Countries that consume large 
quantities of cocoa, like the Netherlands and Germany, are naturally alarmed when cocoa prices 
rise. The political upheaval and the announcement by Mr. Ouattara on January 25 that he will 
ban cocoa exports for one month sent futures in a one-year high. The New York ICE front-month 
cocoa futures rose to a one-year high of $3,340 a metric ton (See: Ivory Coast Cocoa Export Ban 
Brings Price Spike, under: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870355580457610 
                                                           
5 Among the commission's members is Didier Drogba, the international soccer player at FC Chelsea, who is viewed 
as a peace figure. He will represent the Ivorian Diaspora (http://www.gouv.ci/doc/CM%20du%2005-09-11.pdf). 
6 Under: http://www.finances.gouv.ci/fr/cles-de-leconomie/budget-de-letat.html. 7 
 
1492254013756.html). Figure 1 illustrates the spike in February's cocoa prices, which is mostly 
due to the announced ban.  
<<<Figure 1 about here>>> 
There is  not only the price of cocoa that  has gone up due to  external shocks,  such as the 
prevailing labile political environment in Côte d'Ivoire, but there was also an overall increase in 
consumption of cocoa products world-wide. Reports show that for the year 2008/2009, the per 
capita consumption of cocoa in kilograms was 5.6 in Belgium and Switzerland, 3.8 in Germany 
and 3.7 in France and the UK (http://www.kakaoverein.de/rk_32.html). As Table 1 depicts, in 
2009, Côte d'Ivoire alone accounted for about a quarter of the world's total exports in cocoa. At 
the same time, nearly 50% of the world's cocoa exports went mainly to the European Union 
(particularly to the Netherlands, Germany, and France) and the U.S.  
<<<Table 1 about here>>> 
Since its independence from France in 1960, an autonomous Côte d'Ivoire flourished. In fact, the 
1960s is often referred to as 'le miracle ivoirien' or the Ivorian miracle. The fertile arable land of 
the country along with the agricultural expansionary policy initiated by the first President of Côte 
d'Ivoire  provided tremendous employment opportunities to  migrants from the landlocked 
neighboring countries, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.  Even currently, with all its 
political problems, Côte d'Ivoire continuous to be attractive to economic migrants. In 2010, the 
stock of immigrants in Côte d'Ivoire was about 2,406.7 thousand people, or 11.2% of the total 
population (Ratha et al., 2010). The top immigrant sending countries were: Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Guinea, Ghana, Niger, Liberia, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, and Senegal. Immigrants from Burkina 
Faso constitute the largest group with 54.3%. The next largest group is the Malians (18%), 
followed by Guineans (5.5%), and Ghanaians (4.9%); immigrants from other countries constitute 
17.2%. Studies have shown that immigrant labor force participation in Côte d'Ivoire is about 
60%,  indicating  that  the country can accommodate a large number  of immigrant workers 
(Konan, 2009; INS, 2002).  
Political turmoil directly affects the movement of people who live in the affected areas. The 
resulting forced migration and displacement of individuals could occur within the borders of the 
country. For example, people flee from their town, city or region to go to other non affected 8 
 
regions. There could also be international misplacement of people who flee their country. Forced 
migration can equally affect natives or immigrants in a country, who become refugees in other 
countries. Domestic instability in Côte d'Ivoire in the early 2000s resulted in many refugees who 
went to the most direct neighbor countries. The mere volume of the uprooted refugees, can in 
turn cause a negative effect on the economy and growth performance of the host countries, 
leading to increased regional instability (Doré et al., 2003).  
Traditionally, immigrants in Côte d'Ivoire have been sending large amounts of remittances to 
their  home countries. Figure 2  portrays  remittance  outflows from sub-Saharan Africa and 
contrasts them to  the  percentage share of Côte d'Ivoire.  From 1975 to 2008, the share of 
remittances from Côte d'Ivoire made up about 20% of the total remittances from sub-Saharan 
Africa. The substantial drop of remittances in 2000 could be explained by the first coup d'état in 
the nation's  history on Christmas Eve 1999.  Immediately after, economic activities were 
suppressed considerably. 
<<<Figure 2 about here>>> 
Currently, even though the political crisis has been resolved, there are still rippling migration 
effects in the country and the region. Within the country, there are internally displaced people. In 
the democratic neighbor, Liberia, the presence of displaced populations from the political crisis 
in Côte d'Ivoire is also visible. In the close proximity countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso and 
Mali there is a noticeable absence of income from immigration.  
 
IV. Côte d'Ivoire in the WAEMU and Macroeconomic Issues 
 
Côte d'Ivoire, along with seven other francophone countries in West Africa, belongs to the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).  It is also an important member of the 
Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS).
7
                                                           
7 The ECOWAS is a regional group of fifteen countries, founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic 
integration. Its members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
 Obviously, adopting a common 
currency lowers transaction  costs  among trading countries, since purchasing goods from 9 
 
neighboring countries no longer involves changing currencies. Consequently, a monetary union 
is expected to increase regional trade, the way a free trade area or a common market would. 
However, in the case of the CFA franc monetary zone, Masson and Pattillo (2003) show that (i) 
intra-regional trade within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) 
has been modest; (ii) trade between WAEMU and CAEMC is practically non-existent; and (iii) 
trade between the WAEMU countries and France is substantial. The third point about the high 
volume of trade between France and Côte d'Ivoire can be explained by the gravity model, which 
predicts that larger countries exert a greater gravitational pull on imports and push on exports 
than their smaller trading partners. In addition, richer countries (in per capita terms) tend to trade 
more than poorer countries and trading diminishes with a longer distance between the partners. 
Chronic anemic economic growth in the WAEMU countries in the 1980s and early 1990s forced 
the countries to devalue their currency (the CFA franc). In January 1994, the CFA franc was 
devaluated from CFA 50 to CFA 100 = FF1.
8
In Figure 3 we illustrate  the  average GDP growth rates  along with standard deviations for 
selected countries in two time periods. The pre-devaluation period that spans from 1961 to 1993, 
and the post-devaluation period from 1994 to 2009. The figure shows that positive growth 
performances have been realized in the post-devaluation era, especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
and other WAEMU countries such as Togo, Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Benin. However, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau seem to lag behind in the second period. Despite the realized positive 
economic growth, one striking fact is that standard deviations over the period from 1961 to 2009 
for all eight WAEMU countries are by far higher than the sub-Saharan African ones. The high 
standard deviations indicate that growth has been more volatile in the WAEMU countries than in 
 While exports became cheap, imports became 
twice as expensive. One of the strongest arguments made then was the need to reinforce the 
monetary union with a customs union and common economic market, based on the free 
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. Nonetheless, Boogaerde v. d. and 
Tsangarides (2005) show that growth has been driven foremost by country-specific 
developments, with few spillover effects from the WAEMU region as a whole. Labor mobility in 
the region slowed down and competitiveness in the region eroded. 
                                                           
8 This measure was taken under the advice of France, the IMF and the World Bank in order to jump start the franc 
zone economies (Irving, 1999). 10 
 
sub-Saharan Africa; making therefore the WAEMU countries more vulnerable to external 
shocks. 
<<<Figure 3 about here>>> 
To ensure macroeconomic stability and the integrity of the currency peg, the union established a 
system of multilateral surveillance of macroeconomic policy.  This system would ensure a 
convergence of key aggregates in the fiscal area (Boogaerde v. d. and Tsangarides, 2005). Such 
convergence criteria follow the example of the European Union, which has used criteria for 
public deficit ratio to GDP as conditions for country members to join the Euro zone (Masson and 
Pattillo, 2003).  Table 2 provides information about  the  primary and secondary  convergence 
criteria pertaining to public debt, inflation, arrears, etc.  
<<<Table 2 about here>>> 
Côte d'Ivoire  is an important member of WAEMU. It alone accounts for about 40%  of 
WAEMU's output  making  the country a regional  giant (Egoume and Nayo, 2011).  Senegal 
follows with about 20%, and last are the other six countries in WAEMU contributing less than 
10% each. Promoting therefore a set of convergence criteria (such as fiscal discipline, openness 
to international commerce, and competition in the regional market) seems unavoidable to 
achieving regional convergence, and hence alleviating poverty in the region (Boogaerde v. d. and 
Tsangarides, 2005; Wane, 2004). 
In 2009, only one out of the eight country members fully satisfied the key primary criteria such 
as  fiscal balance, public debt, inflation and arrears. This country was Côte d'Ivoire.  While 
Senegal and Benin were also major performers, they failed to satisfy the fiscal balance criterion. 
Another impressive point regarding the performance of these eight countries is that they did not 
accumulate any arrears in 2009. This might partially be explained by the fact that most of these 
countries have qualified for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative.
9
<<<Table 3 about here>>> 
 Table 3 displays recent outcomes for the convergence criteria.  
                                                           
9 For more details see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. 11 
 
The existence and continuation of the CFA franc zone has been subject to debates. Opponents of 
the monetary union claim that maintaining the CFA franc zone is not sensible.
10
Overall, there have been some positive economic trends in the WAEMU countries. Specific 
growth-enhancing factors such as domestic credit to private sector
 The CFA franc 
zone  encompasses two distinct and inconvertible currencies, 14 mostly small countries that 
export different commodities and trade little or not at all within the union. The crux of the matter 
is then that France can exercise control over other countries' economic security. Since December 
4, 1973, France and the WAEMU countries have agreed that at least 65% of their reserves will 
be held at the 'Banque de France' or French Treasury, in the 'compte d'opérations' or operations 
account. In spite of the institutional reforms of 2005, France has kept its modus operandi vis-à-
vis the WAEMU countries. In the beginning of 2010, for example, CFA zone countries had 
€6.1bn ($7.7bn) in operational accounts with the French treasury (Jeune Afrique, 2010). To this 
day, 50% of the WAEMU countries reserves are held at the French Treasury (Banque de France, 
2010).  
11
<<<Figure 4 about here>>> 
 deserve further discussion. 
Figure  4  portrays  two main aspects of the evolution of domestic credit to private sector as 
percentage of GDP. From 1975 to the early 1990's, on average, the share of domestic credit to 
private sector as percentage of GDP was higher in CFA-sub-Saharan Africa than in non-CFA-
sub-Saharan Africa. However, from 1994 onwards one notices a clear downward trend of credit 
to private sector in CFA-sub-Saharan Africa, while at the same time the reverse trend is observed 
in the non-CFA-sub-Saharan Africa. In 2008, the average share of domestic credit to private 
sector as percentage of GDP was 29.3% in the non-CFA-sub-Saharan Africa whereas in the 
CFA-sub-Saharan it was 12.4%.  This indicates an  immature and non-well established 
commercial banking sector in the CFA franc zone compared to the rest of the African continent. 
Advocates of the CFA franc zone argue that its main virtue is stability of prices within the union, 
and  recent studies show that the CFA franc zone has  been able  to deliver better price 
                                                           
10 "11 Ideas for 2011: Remove France's Control of the CFA" (Jeune Afrique: The Africa Report 2011, No. 26, 
December 2010-January 2011). 
11 Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, 
purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for 




The positive economic performances registered for most countries in WAEMU notwithstanding, 
these countries in the monetary union remain highly volatile. At the national level, each of them 
has, de facto, lost its monetary independence and does not have enough room for fiscal policy 
(given the convergence criteria). In a region mostly plagued by conflicts of one sort or another, 
addressing these macroeconomic challenges is a Herculean task. Consequently, it is sustainable 
economic fundamentals such as investing in human capital, that sound macroeconomic policies 
should address. Short-term policy adjustment tools on the other hand should be avoided, as they 
are usually tight with regional constraints.  
 than the floating rate or crawling peg regimes in sub-Saharan-Africa. In spite of 
the relative stable price level in the WAEMU countries, some risks of overvaluation of the CFA, 
as it happened in the 1990s, may reoccur, if domestic inflation cannot be kept at the levels of the 
Euro.  In such a situation, an adjustment of the exchange rate could be tedious  given the 
institutional structure of the CFA franc zone, which requires unanimity among member countries 
for a parity change (Masson and Pattillo, 2003). 
 
V. The Budget and Post-Conflict Economic Policy 
 
Côte d'Ivoire's real GDP is expected to contract by 6.3% this year. This is according to the 
official forecast by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Côte d'Ivoire, after taking into 
account the impact of the economic crisis, the international sanctions during the first quarter of 
the year and the lower-than-expected output of oil and gas (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011). 
Spending in Côte d'Ivoire is likely to rise
13 by 5.3% and to reach 3,050 billion CFA francs or 
(US$6.4  billion).
14
                                                           
12 However, in 2008, the inflation rate in the WAEMU was 7.4% compared to a 2.4% in 2007. This was due to the 
skyrocketing commodity prices of 2007/2008 (Commission de l'UEMOA, June 2009). 
  Increased spending is partly due to the  necessity to honor  previous 
commitments regarding public debt. Specifically, external debt needs to be addressed as part of 
the requirements of the post-crisis reconstruction and economic recovery. It is worth mentioning 
13 Under: http://www.finances.gouv.ci/fr/cles-de-leconomie/budget-de-letat.html. 
14  Calculations follow an  exchange rate of  $US1=CFAfr479.15 as indicated by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance in the 2011 budget. 13 
 
here that most of capital expenditures will be devoted to repair essential public infrastructure that 
was damaged during the recent political turmoil. 
In Table 4, we present the different components of the 2011 budget. The largest part of the 
country's spending is devoted to paying back its debt of 1,292 billion CFA francs. This amount 
accounts for about 42% of total spending. In contrast, capital expenditures will total 340 billion 
CFA francs or about 11.2% of total spending. With spending outpacing revenue, the national 
deficit of about 361 billion CFA francs (or 3.4% of the national output) needs to be raised 
through borrowing (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011). The government promises to balance the 
deficit of 360.5 billion CFA francs. This pledge is predicated upon optimistic assumptions, the 
availability of external financing as well as on the ongoing generosity of donors such as the 
World Bank (24 billion), the Club of Paris and Club of London (239.1 billion), the European 
Union (15 billion), IMF (49.2 billion), and others (33.2 billion). However, with the ongoing 
sovereign debt unraveling  in the Euro zone  and in the U.S., these assumptions may not be 
bounding (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011). 
<<<Table 4 about here>>> 
The level of expenditures dedicated to the debt service shows that the current government has set 
up a high priority into achieving the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt write-off. 
Indeed, as of August 2011, Côte d'Ivoire has not completed the requirements for full debt relief, 
probably due to the aftermath of the November 2010 elections. In Figure 5a we present Côte 
d'Ivoire's composition of external debt. The largest creditor accounting for half of the country's 
external debt is the Paris Club. Commercial loans are the next largest chunk of debt (20%). The 
World Bank is the third largest creditor with 18% and the African Development Bank is last with 
7%. In Figure 5b we go deeper into the country's debt owed to the Club of Paris. Interestingly, 
France is Côte d'Ivoire's main external creditor holding an estimated 60% of the country's Paris 
Club debt. Germany follows with 8%, the U.S. with 6% and eleven other countries with 26%. 
<<< Figure 5a and Figure 5b about here>>> 
The current economic policy, as outlined by President Ouattara,  caries  the  promise of a 
temporary tax cut for businesses to help small companies stay alive through tough economic 
conditions. While this is a positive step, and an extremely popular fiscal tool in the U.S., given 14 
 
the needs of the country and its peoples, a business tax may not be very effective. In Figure 6, we 
present the top ten main obstacles of doing business in Côte d'Ivoire, as they are identified by 
business owners in the Enterprise Survey of 2009.  Access to finance is listed as the most 
important obstacle by almost half of the surveyed business owners (45%). This is a common and 
recurrent obstacle to the private sector in the WAEMU countries. The second main obstacle in 
doing business in Côte d'Ivoire is political instability as testified by 28% of entrepreneurs. 
Corruption is listed third  by almost 8% of entrepreneurs.  As Figure 6 shows, only a few 
entrepreneurs (1%) consider tax rates as an obstacle in doing business in Côte d'Ivoire. It appears 
that a  tax cut alone may not properly address the concerns and needs of the private sector 
entrepreneurs. 
<<< Figure 6 about here>>> 
Disaggregating private companies by size does not alter their main concerns. Notably, small 
firms with 1-19 employees report that their main three obstacles in doing business are access to 
finance, political instability, and corruption. Medium firms with 20-99 employees list political 
instability, access to finance and informal sector issues as major concerns. Large size firms with 
one hundred and more employees find political instability, access to finance, and inadequately 
educated workforce to be the main obstacles (IFC, 2009). Note that the last concern of the large 
size firms raises issues of human capital investment and mismatch in the country.  
 
VI. Human Capital and the Knowledge Economy 
 
Over the course of the years, Côte d'Ivoire has fallen behind other developing economies in 
terms  of improving its  national  Knowledge Economy.  The  key indicator used to assess the 
economic standing of a country is the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI). KEI is constructed and 
implemented by the World Bank Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM). This database 
includes 145 countries. KEI is a good measure of the preparedness of a country in terms of its 
advancement towards  the  Knowledge  Economy.  KEI is an aggregate index representing the 
general development level of a country vis-à-vis the Knowledge Economy. It gauges whether a 
country's knowledge level is conducive to effective economic development.  15 
 
The actual construction of KEI is based on four pillars related to the knowledge economy: (i) 
economic incentives and institutional regime, (ii)  education and human resources, (iii) 
innovation systems, and (iv) Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Specifically, it 
is the average of the normalized performance scores of a country on all four pillars that creates 
KEI.
15 These normalized performance scores are on an ordinal scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being 
the weakest and 10 being the strongest. Figure 7 depicts KEI for selected sub-Saharan countries. 
On the horizontal axis we plot KEI for sub-Saharan countries in 1995. KEI has a range from 0 to 
6. On the vertical axis we plot KEI for the same countries of the most recent year, which in this 
case is 2009.
16
<<< Figure 7 about here>>> 
 The 45-degree line represents the locus of points where KEI values in 1995 are 
equal to those in 2009. Countries that appear above the diagonal exhibit an improvement in KEI 
since 1995; those below the diagonal experience a deterioration in their KEI since 1995. 
Côte d'Ivoire's KEI value for 2009 is 1.65 implying that it ranks in the 16
th percentile out of the 
145 countries included in the KAM database. An interesting fact is that KEI for both 1995 and 
2009, and for almost all sub-Saharan countries is below the 50
th percentile. A notable exception 
are the countries Mauritius and South Africa. The average KEI in 2009 for the region was 2.71 
(27
th percentile). This is much lower than KEI in 1995, which was 3.37 (34
th percentile). This 
indicates a deterioration in the level of development and preparedness of the region towards the 
Knowledge Economy. 
In Table 5, we present the overall recent KEI as well as the index of the four pillars for Côte 
d'Ivoire, Mauritius and the sub-Saharan region. We include the change of KEI between 2009 and 
1995, as well as between 2009 and 2000. Côte d'Ivoire's KEI changes in the period 1995 to 2009 
as well as in the period 2000 to 2009 are negative. This underscores the country's inability to 
keep up with development toward the Knowledge Economy. Côte d'Ivoire has also significantly 
regressed regarding all four pillars of KEI. Between 2000 and 2009, the country regressed by 
0.66 points  in the overall KEI, 0.8 in economic incentive and institutional regime, 0.28 in 
innovation, 0.39 in education, and strongly lost 1.15 points in ICT. Although there has been a 
                                                           
15  Under:  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/KFDLP/EXTUNIKAM/0,,cont 
entMDK:20584278~menuPK:1433216~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1414721,00.html. 
16 In this figure we follow Chen and Suh's (2007) illustration. 16 
 
substantial regression at the regional level, Mauritius managed to be the top performer in KEI. Its 
KEI improved by 0.38 between 1995 and 2009, and by 0.19 between 2000 and 2009. In addition, 
the improvement in KEI for Mauritius is accompanied by a significant improvement in education 
as well in the economic incentive and institutional regime. 
<<<Table 5 about here>>> 
Côte d'Ivoire appears to be underperforming in education. At first sight this may be due to lack 
of public funding in that sector. However, Figure 8 shows that the country allocates more of its 
government expenditures to education than both South Korea and Mauritius do. In fact, this is a 
recurrent  observation  over the past 30 or 40 years. According  to  the 2011 budget of Côte 
d'Ivoire, about 16% of government spending will be allocated to education. This is a higher level 
than the one in South Korea or Mauritius in 2007. The Korean government allocates less than 
15% of its expenditures to education. Yet in 2009 Korea's education score
17
Most important is the role of education in labor market outcomes, economic development and 
the reduction of poverty. Studies have found that increasing education at the primary level alone 
cannot generate enough earnings in the labor market to push people out of poverty.
 was at the 80
th 
percentile.  Thus, high government expenditures alone do  not  guarantee better education 
outcomes. 
18
                                                           
17 See: 
 The key is 
to acquire education that is in line with the needs of the labor market. Inefficiencies and other 
mismatch appear to be at play in Côte d'Ivoire, inhibiting high educational outcomes. An active 
labor market policy that targets and guarantees the employability of youth is in need in Côte 
d'Ivoire. Korea is a success story because government expenditures in higher education were 
closely coordinated with labor market needs.  The Korean government's intervention in  the 
enrolment and graduation of students according to labor market's demand at each stage of 
production managed to reduce economic inefficiencies. It also appeased social problems that 
were due to  oversupply and underemployment of college graduates  (Kim and Rhee,  2007). 





are still some similarities between the underlying problem of the education system in Côte 
d'Ivoire and the case of Korea. Some lessons can therefore be learned from that experience. 
<<< Figure 8 about here>>> 
 
VII. Recapitulation and Concluding Remarks 
 
Côte d'Ivoire's political instability since the late 1990s and early 2000s has been manifested 
regionally as an increase in transaction costs, a diversion of trade away from the country and in 
favor of other neighboring countries equipped with ports. As a state member of the monetary 
union WAEMU, sharing the same currency with other seven francophone countries in the region, 
the country's  political upheaval  has  also  contributed to a reduction of WAEMU's  overall 
potential trade (Egoume and Nayo, 2011). The IMF study underlines the importance of enhanced 
security and further integration as key to achieving higher levels of trade and economic growth 
in the WAEMU countries (ibid).  
Yet again, the political stand-off in Côte d'Ivoire and the resulting mayhem after the second 
round run-off of the presidential elections in November 2010 damaged the country economically, 
shattered  its  social fabric  and  made headline news.  Being the world's largest producer and 
exporter of cocoa beans, the country made a mark last February in the international prices of 
cocoa. In addition, as a leading member of the West African monetary union, Côte d'Ivoire's 
political crisis caused a decrease in trade and an increase in volatility. Rumors of exiting 
WAEMU and having its own currency threatened the existence of the union and the country's 
relationship with France -  and it turn with the rest of the countries in the Euro zone. The 
government's initial estimates of economic losses suffered  by the private sector due to the 
political crisis were about 2 trillion CFA francs, or 20% of GDP. Lastly, as a host country to 
11% immigrant workers, the political crisis  disrupted remittance outflows and negatively 
affected the immigrant sending countries that depend on remittances. Violence during the period 
of political instability also cost thousands of human lives and has left many people displaced. 
The new President  and his cabinet face  many challenges ahead.  Along with the national 
reconciliation,  Côte d'Ivoire's  economic growth and rank in the Knowledge Economy are 18 
 
important priorities. While the 2011 budget is higher than in the previous year, a closer look at 
the spending side reveals that almost 42% of the budget is allocated to debt service, leaving 
therefore less space for government investment and positive multiplier effects. Consequently, the 
country will have to rely on external supports in the short run. External financial support can be, 
however problematic given the ongoing sovereign debt of the Euro zone countries and the U.S.  
The first 100 days of the new President in power are not revealing much. While helping the 
private sector and the small and medium businesses to be healthy and grow is of paramount 
importance in an economy, a proposed tax cut may not be the best approach. Improving access to 
finances remains one of the major challenges that the new administration will have to tackle if it 
wants to rejuvenate the SMEs. 
In the long run the new government will have to deal with additional challenges. An important 
issue is Côte d'Ivoire's preparedness and economic performance towards  the  Knowledge 
Economy. Looking at the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) and contrasting the 1995 scores to 
the 2009 scores it is apparent that the country has been regressing. This is even more noticeable 
when one compares Côte d'Ivoire to Mauritius and South Korea, countries that have significantly 
improved  over the years. A thorny issue is the country's inability to improve investment in 
human capital and produce a competitive labor force. While Côte d'Ivoire has the highest share 
of government spending on education,  its education outcomes are not commensurate to the 
expenses. This indicates the existence of inefficiencies in the system. Given the limitation of 
being in a monetary union that is rendering any short run adjustments impossible, the current 
government should be tackling long run issues such as education to better position the country in 
the global competiveness of high skilled workers. 
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Box 1: Basic Data About Côte d'Ivoire 
   
Land area  322,463 sq km 
Population (in millions)  21.1 (IMF estimate, 2009) 
Stock of emigrants as percentage of the population, 
2010 
5.4% 
Stock of immigrants as percentage of the population, 
2010 
11.2% 
Languages  The official language is French. Also spoken are: 
Dioula, Baoulé, Bété, Agni, and other local 
languages 
Nominal GDP (USD m, 2011)  22,203 (Economist Intelligence Unit estimates) 
Real GDP growth (2010)  3.6% 
GDP per capita (USD at PPP, 2010)  1,736 
Currency  Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) or African 
Financial Community franc. The CFA franc is fixed 
to the euro at a rate of CFAfr655.9 per 1€ 
Main export destinations, 2009 (share of total)  Netherlands (13.9%), France (10.7%), the US 
(7.8%), Germany (7.2%), and others (60.4%) 
Main origins of imports, 2009 (share of total)  Nigeria (20.7%), France (14.2%), China (7.2%), 
Thailand (5.1%), and others (52.8%) 
 
Political Structure 
   
Official name  République de Côte d'Ivoire 
Form of state  Unitary Republic 
Legal system  Based on the July 2000 constitution and the 
Napoleonic Code 
Head of State  The president, elected by universal suffrage to a five 
year-term. The term can only be renewed once 
Current Head of State  Alassane Dramane Ouattara  
Source: World Bank, IMF, and Economist Intelligence Unit; Authors' Presentation 22 
 
 
   
Box 2: CFA Franc Zone and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
 
CFA stands for 'Communauté Financière Africaine' or African Financial Community. The CFA franc 
zone is composed of two regions: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC). The two regions issue two distinct 
versions of the CFA franc: the West African version, called the franc of the 'Communauté Financière 
Africaine' or the Financial Community of Africa and the Central African version, called the franc of the 
'Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale' or Financial Cooperation of Central Africa. The CAEMC 
members are: Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The 
CFA franc zone also includes Comoros that has its own central bank and currency.  
 
Established in 1994, WAEMU consist of eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau (joined the Union in May 1997), Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. These countries have a common 
currency – the CFA franc – which was pegged to the French franc from 1948 to 1999, and pegged to euro 
since then. The fixed parity of the CFA to the Euro is: CFA 655.957/€1.  
 
In addition to the common central bank, Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest  (the 
BECEAO), the WAEMU institutions include the WAEMU Commission, the Banking Commission, and 
the regional stock exchange. In recent years, WAEMU countries have taken important steps toward a 
greater regional integration and coordination of macroeconomic policies. Adopting convergence criteria 
(somewhat similar to the Maastricht Criteria in the European Union), establishing a common external 
tariff, and harmonizing taxes have been the three means of coordination.  
 




Table 2: WAEMU: Convergence Criteria 
Variable  Reference Value 
Primary Criteria 
Basic fiscal balance (fiscal position excluding grants  
and public investment financed externally) 
At least 0 
External public debt/GDP  No more than 70% 
Rate of inflation  No more than 3% 
Payment arrears  No accumulation (and reduction of 
existing stock) 
Secondary Criteria 
Public sector wage bill/government revenues  No more than 35% 
Government revenue/GDP  At least 17% 
Domestically financed public investment  At least 20% of tax receipts 
Current account deficit, excluding grants/GDP  Less than 3% 
Source: www.ifz.net; Masson and Patillo (2003)   
 
   
Table 1: Top Six Cocoa Exporting and Importing Countries (2009) 
Exports    Imports 
Country or Area  Value 
(in US$ m) 
World Share    
(in %) 
  Country or Area  Value 
(in US$ m) 
World Share 
(in %) 
World  15,976.7  100    World  15,834.6  100 
Côte d'Ivoire  3,606.1  22.6    The Netherlands  2,383.2  15.1 
Netherlands  2,569.9  16.1    The U.S.  2,184.4  13.8 
Ghana  1,508.7  9.4    Germany  1,904.8  12.0 
Nigeria  1,427.1  8.9    France  1,189.9  7.5 
Indonesia  1,383.7  8.7    Belgium  1,097.2  6.9 
Rest of the World  5,481.2  34.3    Rest of the World  7,075.1  44.7 
Source: UNTACD, 2009 International Trade Statistics Yearbook; Authors' Presentation 24 
 


























Benin  -3.5  25.1  2.3  0  39.4  47.4  17.9  -11.6  5 
Burkina Faso  -2.4  26.2  2.6  0  49.6  55.8  12.0  -12.6  4 
Côte d'Ivoire  2.9  63.1  0.9  0  39.7  12.6  17.3  0.3  5 
G-Bissau  -2.9  245.9  -1.6  0  78.3  3.9  12.1  -26.0  2 
Mali  -1.4  38.2  2.3  0  38.5  26.1  13.3  -9.3  4 
Niger  -0.6  23.1  4.4  0  29.4  35.6  12.5  -18.1  4 
Senegal  -1.2  26.9  -0.8  0  33.2  34.8  19.1  -9.9  6 
Togo  -2.1  65.6  1.9  0  36.2  17.1  14.4  -9.0  3 
Source: Commission de l'UEMOA, Rapport Semestriel d'Exécution de la Surveillance Multilatérale, Décembre 2009 
Note: * : as percent of GDP, ** : as percent of Government Revenues; shaded areas are where countries met their targets 
 
Table 4: Côte d'Ivoire's National Budget (2011)   
Components  Amount (CFAfr bn) 
Total Revenue  2,690 
Domestic Revenue  2,086 
External Revenue (incl. budget support & grants)  604 
Total Spending  3,050 
Recurrent Expenditure  2,710 
Debt Service  1,292 
Public-sector salaries  727 
Capital Expenditure  340 
Budget Balance  -361 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance of Côte d'Ivoire, Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2011 
 
Table 5: Cross-Country Comparison of the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 




Change   
Index 
(2009) 
















Overall KEI  2.71  -0.66  -0.3    1.65  -1.12  -0.66    5.48  0.38  0.19 
EI & IR
*  2.68  0.3  -0.17    1.37  -0.71  -0.8    8.01  1.95  1.79 
Innovation  4.31  -0.26  0.2    2.28  -0.84  -0.28    3.63  -0.31  -0.6 
Education  1.38  -0.28  -0.22    1.09  -0.59  -0.39    4.03  0.31  0.26 
ICT  2.45  -2.44  -1.05    1.87  -2.63  -1.15    6.23  -0.45  -0.71 
Source: KAM, World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page9.asp; Authors' Calculations 
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Figure 1: Average Prices per Tonne of Cocoa in US$ (2005 - 2011)


























































































































































Sub-Saharan Africa Share of Cote d'Ivoire (RHS)
Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Online Database; Own Calculations































Pre-Devaluation (1961-1993) Post-Devaluation (1994-2009) Standard Deviations (1961-2009)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, Online Database; Own Calculations

















































































































































Average share Non-CFA-Sub-Saharan Africa Average Share CFA-Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators (ADI), Online database; Own Calculation
Figure 4: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)27 
 


















Figure 5a: Côte d'Ivoire's External Debt (End of 2007)









Figure 5b: Côte d'Ivoire's Debt to the Paris Club
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Figure 6: Top Ten Main Obstacles of Doing Business in Côte d'Ivoire
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Source: KAM, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp; Authors' Presentation 
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Source: World Bank, WDI&GDF, [SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS]; Authors' Presentation
Figure 8: Total Public Spending on Education as Percentage of Government Expenditure